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response to the respondent's brief, the appellant makes the following legal arguments.
1. The State's rephrasing of the issue on appeal is improper and asks this Court to apply an

incorrect standard of review and to improperly rubber stamp the district court's decision
as a matter of procedure.
The State argues that the "appellate court is to "exam.ine[s] the magistrate record to
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's
findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow :from those findings." "If
those findings are supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court's decision as a
matter of procedure." (Respondent's Brief, p.3). The State further attempted to cloud the issue
by arguing that because Mr. Watt failed to show error in the district court's intermediate
appellate decision, his appeal therefore fails.
The correct standard of review for a motion to suppress evidence for a violation of
constitutional rights presents questions of fact and law. The Court exercises :free review in
determining whether constitutional standards have been met in light of the facts presented. State
v. Holler, 136 Idaho 287, 291, 32 P.3d 679 (Ct.App.2001). The district court's opinion in its

intermediate appellate capacity has no bearing on this Courts review of constitutional principles
applied to the facts.
2. Deputy Clark lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the continued detention of
Jaryn Watt after the initial basis for the consensual encounter was abandoned and a drug
investigation began.
Not all contacts between police officers and citizens constitute a seizure.

State v.

Guiterrez, 137 Idaho 647,650, 51 P.3d 461,464 (Ct.App.2002). However a seizure occurs when
an officer takes a driver's license, because all drivers are required to carry their licenses on them
at all times. State v. Osborn, 121 Idaho 520, 826 P.2d 481 (Ct.App.1991). The State asserts that

1

there was reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Watt after the initial consensual contact and
that the length of the detention was reasonable. (Respondent's Brief, p.7). The state makes a
very conclusory statement asserting that the deputy "quickly had reasonable articulable suspicion
that Watt was under the influence of drugs" (Respondent's Brief, p.7). This suspicion is based
solely on an observation that Mr. Watt's "pupils didn't react much to light" and his eyes were
"bloodshot and watery." (Respondent's Brief, p.7). The question for this Court is (1) "whether
the officer's actions were justified at its inception" and (2) "whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).

In State v. Brumfield the Court upheld a forty-five minute detention to wait for the arrival
of a drug dog. 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct.App.2001). The Court emphasized that
the officer had obtained reasonable grounds for suspecting drugs before he called a canine.
"factors then known to Lieutenant Black which contributed to this reasonable
suspicion included the following: (1) while the officer was driving alongside the
car, Brumfield was sitting low in the passenger seat puffing excessively on a cigar
while the driver assumed a position that could have been intended to block the
officer's view of the passenger; (2) after the stop, Black noticed a very strong
cigar odor coming from the car; (3) Houston and Brumfield gave inconsistent
stories about the purpose of their trip, and Houston also amended his story about
the state of destination; (4) Black discovered a bag of cooked pork chops in the
back seat which might have been intended to distract a drug dog; and (5)
Brumfield claimed not to know what was in the trunk, despite having traveled in
the car for three days. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that strong odors in
vehicles will contribute to reasonable suspicion of the presence of drugs. See State
v. Briggs, 140 N.C.App. 484, 536 S.E.2d 858, 863 (2000) (burnt cigar
odor); United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 57 F.3d 895, 898 (10th
Cir.1995) (strong smell of perfume). Inconsistency in vehicle occupants' stories
has also been held to support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See,
e.g., United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 758 (11th Cir.1988) (after their vehicle
was stopped for speeding, driver's and passenger's inconsistent stories supported a
finding of reasonable suspicion). Although many of the circumstances that
aroused Lieutenant Black's suspicion are susceptible to innocent explanation,
"a series of acts that appear innocent, when viewed separately, may warrant
further investigation when viewed together." United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d
2

391, 394 (8th Cir.1992). See also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10, 109
S.Ct. 1581, 1586-1587, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 11-12 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968).

State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct.App.2001). Thus, the ultimate

question here is whether the detention was reasonably extended based on Deputy Lakey's
suspicions or whether he purposefully extended the stop to allow time for the canine unit to
amve.

Unlike the officer in Brumfield, Deputy Clark obtained no reasonable, articulable

suspicion of drug related activity. It was 10:15 pm, Deputy Clark asserted that the defendant's
eyes were blood shot and watery and did not react much to a flashlight. Deputy Clark however,
did not inquire as to Mr. Watt's day, whether he had been working or sleeping, he had never met
Mr. Watt and would not know how his eyes normally appear. Deputy Clark did not inquire as to
whether Mr. Watt wore contacts or whether he had any type of eye infection. He instead focused
on a drug investigation. Deputy Clark further testified that there was no odor of alcohol or illicit
drugs.
The State asserts that Deputy Clark detained Mr. Watt for a reasonable period of time to
confirm or dispel his suspicion of being under the influence of drugs. (Respondent's Brief, p.8)
The State further asserts that the tests offered by Deputy Clark, given his belief that Mr. Watt
was under the influence of something other than alcohol, falls far short of an improper stall and
delay tactic, much less a constitutional violation. (Respondent's Brief, p.9). Without any real
indication of drug use, Deputy Clark began offering Mr. Watt tests. The reason we know this
was a stall and delay tactic was because Deputy Clark did not engage in the standard field
sobriety testing. Whether an officer suspects alcohol or drugs officers are trained to perform
standard field sobriety tests which provide further probable cause to then ask an individual to
participate in a drug recognition evaluation. Deputy Clark did not even attempt to engage in
3

standardized testing. He did not perform a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, a walk and turn or a
one leg stand test. Instead he claimed to measure his pupils, in which he admits to only having a
"few" hours of training, and he took his pulse, which would not lead to any further reasonable
articulable suspicion. Because Deputy Clark was "just kind of curious" and decided to pursue an
investigation without any reasonable articulable suspicion Mr. Watt's rights constitutional rights
were violated.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Watt respectfully requests that this court reverse the
trial court's decision denying his motion to suppress.

DATED this 26th day of August 2014.

HEIDI J(}HNSON
Attorney for Defendant
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